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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
TAX DEEDS-WHEN ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF A TAX DEED Is NOT SUBJECT
TO A COLLATERAL ATrAcK-The recent case of Urban v. Lois, Inc.,' adds a
new link to the chain of Illinois Supreme Court decisions which have been
establishing the absolute stability of title derived through an annual sale
tax deed.
The suit was commenced upon the Cook County Collector's application
for judgment and order of sale for 1958 delinquent general real estate taxes.
On July 7, 1960, pursuant to the judgment and order of sale of the County
Court, the properties in question were sold at public auction to Interstate
Bond Company, the respondent's predecessor in title, for the unpaid taxes,
and a certificate of purchase issued therefor. Because the properties were
registered in the Torrens system, sworn copies of the certificates of purchase
were filed with the Registrar of Titles in June, 1961.2
In April, 1962, the owners of the properties went to S. Urban, Jr., the
petitioner mortgagee, and borrowed $2000.00 to pay off debts, including
the delinquent taxes on their property. Urban agreed to pay the tax debts.
Urban then ordered a tax search and received estimates of cost of
redemption from the County Clerk indicating the tax sale to the Inter-
state Bond Co. Next, Urban gave the owners of the properties a closing
statement which showed payouts including one for the "tax bills to date,"
which admittedly had never been paid.
Two months after Urban's mortgage was filed of record, Interstate
Bond Co. filed petitions in the County Court for orders directing issuance
of tax deeds to the properties.8 Interstate, however, failed to give notice
by personal service to Urban of the tax deed proceedings as required by
the Revenue Act.4 After several communications with Interstate Bond
1 29 Ill. 2d 542, 194 N.E.2d 294 (1963).
2 The fact that the properties were in Torrens is of no consequence to the outcome
of this case. The court held that, ". . . failure to serve notice on an interested party
pursuant to the provisions of the Torrens Act, [Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, § 120 (1953)] deprived
the court of jurisdiction to order this issuance of a new Torrens owner's certificate of
title under the special provisions of that act . . . (but) did not affect the validity of the
tax deed." Id. at 547, 194 N.E.2d at 297.
8 Pursuant to statute, the petitions were filed as supplemental proceedings within the
County Collector's application for judgment and order of sale for delinquent 1958 taxes.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 747 (1963).
4 The notice referred to here is that required by Section 263 which states:
In such notices the purchaser, or his assignee, shall state when he purchased the
real estate, in whose name last taxed, the description of the real estate he has
purchased; what taxes or special assessments were included in the judgment or
decree for which the real estate was sold, and when the time of redemption will
expire.
This notice must be served "not less than three months prior to the date when the time
of redemption or extended redemption ... shall expire." This service must be service
made upon "parties interested in such real estate including trustees and mortgagees of
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Co., Urban forwarded two checks to it covering the amount of the re-
demption price. Both checks were twice returned uncollected bearing
the notation "non-sufficient funds." Although Interstate notified Urban
of this fact, no further attempts at redemption were made. The two year
period of redemption elapsed, and was even extended pursuant to Section
263 of the Revenue Act,5 by Interstate.
After expiration of the extended period of redemption, Interstate sold
and assigned its certificates of purchase to respondent, Lois, Inc., which
received the tax deeds by orders of the County Court pursuant to Section
266 of the Revenue Act.6
Although the time for appeal from the tax deed orders had not ex-
pired, Urban filed his petition under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act7
to set them aside. He claimed that he was not personally served with notice
of the tax deed proceedings,s and charged Lois, Inc. with fraud in the
procurement of the tax deeds.
After a trial on the merits, the trial court expressly found that no
fraud had been perpetrated by Lois, Inc.; however, it set aside the tax deeds
on the grounds that Urban, the mortgagee, had not been personally served
with notice. Upon direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held
that all irregularities in the tax deed proceedings subsequent to the issuance
of the certificate of purchase were cured by the tax deed orders because
the County Court had proper jurisdiction at the time of their entry, and,
in the absence of fraud, the orders could not be contested under Section 72
of the Civil Practice Act.
Urban was the first case since the 1951 amendments to the Revenue
Act 9 which provided the Supreme Court with a fact situation where there
record." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 744 (1963). This same notice is required by Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 120, § 747 (1963), which is commonly known as Section 266. See note 9, infra.
5 Presently cited as Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 744 (1963). It should be noted that
this same type of notice statute applies to all four types of tax sales which are: Foreclosure,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 697 (1963); Annual, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 716 (1963); Scavenger,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 716a (1963); and Forfeiture, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 753 (1963).
See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 744 (1963).
6 Presently cited as Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 747 (1963). It should be noted that
an order similar to that of Section 266 must be entered before tax deeds can issue at all
four types of tax sales, the Foreclosure, Annual, Scavenger, and Forfeiture. See note 5,
supra.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 72 (1963).
8 As stated in the text at note 4 supra, this contention is valid.
9 The 1951 Amendments occurred in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 734, 735, 744, 746, 747,
749, 750, and 751 (1963). The amicus curiae brief of George E. Drach in Remer v. Interstate
Bond Co., 21 Ill. 2d 504, 173 N.E.2d 425 (1961), provides an excellent summation of the
1951 Amendments. For an explanation of the 1951 Amendments, the following quotation
from this brief is appropriate:
The language added by the 1951 Amendments provides in substance that
the purchaser at a tax sale, or his assignee, may petition the county court for
an order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed. The county court is then
authorized (upon certain notice to be given as prescribed in the section) and in
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was no fraud in issue upon appeal' 0 and where there was no attempt made
to personally serve a party entitled to notice pursuant to Section 263 and
266 of the Revenue Act."
Prior to the 1951 Amendments, 12 annual sale tax deeds were issued
solely on the affidavit of the purchaser filed with the County Clerk who
determined if there had been compliance with the Revenue Act entitling
the tax purchaser to a tax deed.'8 This procedure was subject to judicial
review at anytime in the future in order to give the previous record parties
in interest their "day in court." As a result, a large number of suits were
filed contesting the pre-1951 tax deeds. The courts, in their efforts to pro-
tect the taxpayer, held tax deeds to be quite vulnerable to almost any
type of attack; consequently, real estate purchasers refused to bid or buy
at annual tax sales because tax deed titles were neither final nor conclusive.
As delinquent taxes mounted because of the county's failure to induce
purchasing at the tax sale, more and more land dropped out of commerce.
In addition, the county lost an important source of revenue. 14
For these reasons, in 1951 a new procedure was adopted by the legis-
lature similar to that used in tax foreclosures, whereby the same court
the event:(1) The time of redemption has expired without the real estate having been
redeemed;
(2) All taxes and special assessments which became due and payable subse-
quent to sale have been paid and all subsequent forfeitures and sales
have been redeemed [as required by Section 247];
(3) The notices required by law have been given [as required by Section 263];
and
(4) The petitioner has complied with all the provisions of law entitling him
to a deed;
to enter an order so finding and directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed.
[This is a Section 266 order.] If the order is refused 'because of the failure of
the purchaser to fulfill any of the above provisions,' the purchase price is to be
ordered returned as in the case of sales in error if 'the purchaser or his assignee
has made a bona fide attempt to comply with the statutory requirements' for
issuance of a tax deed. The county court is given jurisdiction to issue a writ of
assistance to put the grantee in possession. Brief of George E. Drach, Attorney, as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 4 & 5, Remer v. Interstate Bond Co., 21 Ill. 2d 504, 175
N.E.2d 425 (1961).
10 The trial court specifically found that no fraud had been committed by respondent
in the procurement of the tax deeds or at any other time in the tax deed proceeding.
Therefore, since no fraud was evident from the record and the petitioner did not contend
fraud upon appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that no fraud existed. But see text
at note 41, infra for dicta regarding fraud.
11 See text at note 4 supra.
12 See note 9 supra,
18 Pre-1951 tax deeds were issued at the discretion of the County Clerk-it was a
purely ministerial function and not judicial in nature. Therefore, the court required
strict compliance with annual sale tax deed where even the slightest defect or omission
appeared in the affidavit filed with the County Clerk. Cherin v. The R. & C. Company,
11 Ill. 2d 447, 143 N.E.2d 235 (1957).
14 The historical conclusions made in this and the previous paragraph were drawn
from the court's discussion of pre-1951 tax deeds in Cherin v. The R. & C. Company, supra
note 13. For a table indicating the financial importance of annual tax sales in Cook
County, see text at note 59, infra.
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which enters the judgment ordering sale makes findings of compliance with
the law in its order directing the County Clerk to issue a tax deed.15 The
intent of the legislature was to make the order directing the issuance of a
tax deed final. This purpose is manifested by that part of the 1951 Amend-
ments which states:
Tax deeds issued pursuant to this section shall be incontest-
able except by appeal from the order of the county court directing
the county clerk to issue the tax deed. This section shall be liberally
construed so that tax deeds herein provided for shall convey mer-
chantable title. 16
The 1951 Amendments were construed by the court in Urban in such
a manner as to give full effect to this evident legislative intent. It would
be well at this time to review the cases pertinent to the subject of collateral
attack involving annual tax sale deeds which have reached the Supreme
Court since 1951.17
The landmark case in this area is Cherin v. The R. & C. Company,'8
where the property owners collaterally attacked a Section 266 tax deed
order finding that all notices required by law had been given. The court
summed up the question presented as follows: "Therefore, the question
before us is whether, after more than 30 days from the entry of the order
of the county court, petitioner may attack its finding that 'all notices re-
quired by law have been given . ..'"19 It was held that the attack on the
order some eight months after its entry was collateral; that the county
court had jurisdiction to determine whether the appropriate statutory
notices had been given;20 and that such determination was not open to
collateral attack.
The facts in the Cherin case are closely analogous to Urban. However,
in Cherin diligent inquiry was made to serve the owners with notice, and
service was made upon all of the tenants on the premises. The court stated
that such service after diligent inquiry to locate the owners complied with
Section 263 of the Revenue Act2l and was deemed the equivalent to service
on the owners. In Urban, there was no service made or attempted upon a
mortgagee of record.
15 See note 9 supra.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 447 (1963).
17 The fact that there has been such a dirth of litigation in this field as compared
with the number of properties sold at annual tax sales (see text at note 59 infra) shows
that this law is not being misused and is inherently fair.
18 11 Ill. 2d 447, 143 N.E.2d 235 (1957).
19 Id. at 453, 143 N.E.2d at 238.
20 The court said that the jurisdiction over the subject matter and the land in
question was acquired by publication shown in the County Collector's application for
the sale of the delinquent land. This jurisdiction was held to have been retained until
the Section 266 tax deed was issued. Cherin v. The R. & C. Company, Id. at 454, 143
N.E.2d at 239.
21 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 744 (1963). See note 4 supra.
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The next year, Southmoor Bank and Trust Co. v. Willis22 was decided.
The Section 266 tax deed in that case was issued approximately eleven
months before the owner's petition under Section 72 of the Civil Practice
Act. The petitioner validly contended that the tax purchaser had not
completed his sale in accordance with Section 24728 of the Revenue Act,
and therefore, the trial court set aside its previous order which found com-
pliance with the Revenue Act and ordered a tax deed to issue. In reversing
the trial court, the court held Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act and
Section 266 of the Revenue Act to be in pari materia in that the former
also applies to tax deed proceedings. However, it held that the relief per-
mitted by Section 72 is the same relief formerly available by bill of review
or writ of error corum nobis; that no ground for relief available by bill
or review was alleged; and that no relief would have been available under
the former writ of error coram nobis because that remedy could not be used
to contradict findings which appeared on the face of the judgment and the
Section 266 order in question expressly found that the subsequent taxes
had been paid. Therefore, relief was denied.
In Cherin and Southmoor, the Supreme Court declared the underlying
philosophy used in its trend to make annual tax sale deeds final. This under-
lying philosophy was expressed in Southmoor as follows:
It is apparent that section 266 of the Revenue Act and section
72 of the Civil Practice Act relate to the same thing, subject or
object-the contestability and validity of an order providing for
the issuance of a tax deed. Such statutes are in pari materia
although they were enacted at different times ... [and] "should be
construed together .. " In the light of the legislative purpose as
manifested in these statutes, considered with reference to the reason
for the enactments, we conclude that the legislature desired to
render tax titles incontestable except by direct appeal, subject to
the provisions of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, whereby a
uniform procedure was established for obtaining relief from all
final orders, judgments and decrees within its purview. 24
In the case of Remer v. Interstate Bond Co., 25 a noteholder secured
by a trust deed conveying the property to a trustee, filed an attack on the
tax deed order six months after it's entry. Although this noteholder was not
personally served, the trustee was. The noteholder alleged that the notice
requirement of Section 263 was not complied with, that she was denied due
process of law, and that the tax deed proceedings were subject to Sections
50(2) and 50(8) of the Civil Practice Act.26 The court summarily denied the
22 15 111. 2d 388, 155 N.E.2d 308 (1958).
28 Presently cited as Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 728 (1963). See note 9 supra.
24 Southmoor Bank & Trust Co. v. Willis, supra note 22, at 394-5, 155 N.E.2d at 311.
25 21 111. 2d 504, 173 N.E.2d 425 (1961).
26 Section 50(2) provides that where multiple parties or claims are involved in an
action, the judgment or decree thereof is final only upon an express finding that there
is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.
Section 50(8) provides inter alia that where a final judgment or decree is entered
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latter two points27 and further held that since the noteholder was not a
party of record, she was adequately served by publication under "Unknown
Owners" in the local newspaper. Then the court reiterated its holdings in
the Cherin and Southmoor cases. The court also summarily dismissed the
noteholder's contention that she was denied due process by saying that there
is no requirement in the statute that personal notice be given to a note-
holder, and that such a provision would be wholly unpractical. 2s This latter
reasoning was apparently followed by the court in In re Estate of English.29
The noteholder in Remer also contended fraud by certain respondents
against any defendant served by publication, and where a sale has been made pursuant
to the judgment or decree, said defendant, his heirs, devisees or personal representatives,
can file a petition for redemption within 90 days after notice in writing is given him of
the judgment or decree, or within one year after the judgment or decree if no notice
has been given. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 50(2) & 50(8) (1963).
27 The court said in regard to Section 50(2):
This theory is without substantial merit. The order for issuance of deed
disposed of all issues therein presented and, when entered, became a final,
appealable order without regard to the fact that writs of assistance might later
be issued pursuant thereto.
The court continued:
Neither do we believe that section 50(8) of the Civil Practice Act [Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 110, par. 50(8) (1957)] may be successfully asserted in the present case.
That provision applies only to judgments or decrees entered against "any defedant
who has been served by publication with notice of the commencement of the
action" and is not applicable to the notice requirements for tax deed contained
in the Revenue Act. Remer v. Interstate Bond Co., 21 Ill. 2d at 509 & 510, 173
N.E.2d at 428.
28 The respondent's brief has a noteworthy answer to the noteholder's contention
that she was denied due process. It states:
Article IX, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution which provides for notices
in tax deed proceedings, specifically provides that except for occupants, all other
parties may be served with notice of the tax deed proceedings by publication.
[The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this position in Farlow v. Oliver, 29 Ill.
2d 493, 194 N.E.2d 262 (1963).] Only the occupants of the property must be
served personally.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld a similar statute. In Leigh v.
Green, 193 U.S. 79, it was contended that a Nebraska statute which omitted to
make provision for service of notice of the pendency of tax deed proceedings
upon lien holders violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
In rejecting the claim that the statute deprived him of his property without due
process of law, the court stated in part as follows (page 89):
"The process of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is
required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking private property
under the power of eminent domain. It involves no violation of due process
when it is executed according to customary forms and established usages,
or in subordination to the principles which underlie them." Bell's Gap R.R.
v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239.
(and at page 92)
"Where the State seeks directly or by authorization of others to sell
land for taxes upon proceedings to enforce a lien for the payment thereof,
it may proceed directly against the land within jurisdiction of the court, and
a notice which permits all interested, who are 'so minded' to ascertain that
it is to be subjected to sale to answer for taxes, and to appear and be heard,
whether to be found within the jurisdiction or not, is due process of law
without the 14th Amendment to the Constitution." Brief for Appellee, p. 40,
Remer v. Interstate Bond Co., supra note 25.
It should be noted that the Illinois Supreme Court cited Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79
(1904), in Cherin with approval.
29 24 Ill. 2d 357, 181 N.E.2d 111 (1962).
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who allegedly acted in conspiracy to conceal the tax deed proceedings from
her. The court held this matter had neither been in issue nor passed upon
by the trial court, and if true, would clearly be sufficient to warrant relief
under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act; therefore, the case was remanded
for proceedings on the issue of fraud.
Shuck v. Guarantee Bank & Trust Co.3o was a suit to attack a Section
266 order for a tax deed under the Reconveyance Act of 1909.31 This Act
gave property owners the right to obtain reconveyance of property sold for
taxes where the tax deed holder did not take possession of the property or
institute suit therefor within one year after the issuance of his tax deed, or
where the tax purchaser allowed subsequent forfeitures or tax sales.
The Shuck case was instituted in 1961-five years after the tax deed was
issued. The court held that the 1959 amendments to the Reconveyance Act
making it applicable only to tax deeds issued pursuant to tax sales "held on
or prior to September 1, 1951,132 was valid and proper. The history of the
1951 amendments to the Revenue Act was reviewed by the court including
a long quote from the Cherin case. The court then made the following
conclusions which provide strong indication of a present trend to uphold
annual sale tax deeds.
In recognition of the desirability of merchantability, the Re-
conveyance Act provided an appropriate method of removing
forfeited land from limbo and returned it to commerce. The efficacy
of the amended Revenue Act in providing merchantable tax titles
eliminated the need of a Reconveyance Act applicable to tax sales
subsequent to the 1951 Amendments .... We are therefore of the
opinion ... that the legislature in 1959 clearly intended that a
petition under the Reconveyance Act should not be applicable to
tax sales subsequent to September 1, 1951.33
People ex rel. Wright v. Doe34 reiterated the holdings of all of the
previous annual sale tax deed cases after 1951, and especially the Remer
case since fraud was alleged. In addition, the court held that although a
bona fide purchaser is protected from his seller's fraud in the tax deed pro-
ceedings, the party who has committed the fraud is liable to the former
owner. The case, which was brought under Section 72 of the Civil Practice
Act, was remanded for proceedings on the question of fraud similar to the
Remer case.
Shapiro v. Hruby,85 Stanley v. The Bank of Marion,8 6 and Freisinger v.
80 26 Ill. 2d 123, 186 N.E.2d 41 (1962).
31 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 736 (1963).
82 Ibid.
33 Shuck v. Guarantee Bank & Trust Co., supra note 30, at 127-8, 186 N.E.2d at 44.
84 26 Ill. 2d 446, 187 N.E.2d 222 (1962).
85 21 I1. 2d 353, 172 N.E.2d 768 (1961).
36 23 Ill. 2d 414, 178 N.E.2d 367 (1961).
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Interstate Bond Co.3 7 merely reaffirm the court's holdings in Cherin and
Southmoor.
The Urban case not only added a new phase to the decisions discussed
hereinbefore, because of its new fact situation, but it served to clarify the
holdings in Cherin and Southmoor in a way which had not previously
been done.
The court began by establishing the jurisdiction of the county court
to issue the Section 266 order for a tax deed. It stated that, "the entire
tax-sale proceeding is one in rem rather than in personam." The court
then said that, "this in rem jurisdiction was established as in Cherin, by
the publication shown in the County Collector's application for the
original sale of the delinquent land."38
Although the court did not raise the point, it is implied by the facts in
Urban, and was specially held by the court in People v. O'Keefe,8 9 that the
doctrine of lis pendens notice of pending litigation applies to all parties
who acquire an interest from a party to the record, after the commencement
of a suit involving the property. This means that such parties are placed
under the jurisdiction of the court even though they are not formally given
notice. The respondent's brief in Urban strongly urged this point.40 It is
submitted that the court could have adopted this doctrine in Urban, and
that this doctrine can be utilized in the future, in a similar factual situation,
when the petitioner has no actual knowledge of the tax deed proceedings.
In regard to allegations of fraud in Urban, which the court summarily
disposed of,4 ' the court made the following interesting comment via dicta:
Because of the informal nature of the application for a tax
deed, the existence of an opportunity for fraud must be conceded.
This is especially true when the testimony relating to service is
based upon an ex parte affidavit. This opportunity can, however,
be remedied by diligent cross-examination by the State's Attorney,
and the clear availability of relief under Section 72.4
The court, in Urban, did mention the fact in its holding that the
petitioner had full knowledge of the tax sale proceedings. From this, it
must be assumed that the court applied the estoppel doctrine which was
87 24 111. 2d 37, 179 N.E.2d 608 (1962).
88 Urban v. Lois, Inc., 29 Ill. 2d at 546, 194 N.E.2d at 296. Even the appearance of
the taxpayer cannot make the proceeding a personam action. People v. Dragstran, 100
Ill. 286 (1881). The Section 263 notice given to the taxpayer is not jurisdictional and
in no way operates as a summons. See People v. O'Keefe, 18 111. 2d 386, 164 N.E.2d 5
(1960). The United States Supreme Court has stated: "In regard to taxes it is the land
and not the owner that owes the debt and an action in rem is proper." Leigh v. Green,
193 U.S. 79, at 83 (1903).
39 18 Ill. 2d 386, 164 N.E.2d 5 (1960).
40 Brief for Appellant, pp. 21 & 22, Urban v. Lois, Inc., supra note 38.
41 See note 10 supra.
42 Urban v. Lois, Inc., supra note 38, at 550, 194 N.E.2d at 298.
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urged in respondent's brief and reply brief.48 The doctrine as applied in
tax deed cases is that an interested party's knowledge of the proceedings
estops him from attacking the tax deed collaterally. This age old doctrine
was clearly applied in People v. Cottine,44 and was impliedly used in People
v. Orth45 and People v. O'Keefe.4 6 Moreover, it appears evident from all re-
cent Supreme Court decisions in the area that a tax deed may be collaterally
attacked only in the case of fraud, and it would be impossible for a
petitioner to claim fraud if he had had knowledge of the proceedings.4 7
Therefore, it follows that if an interested party has had actual knowledge
of the tax proceedings, there is absolutely no basis upon which he can
collaterally attack the tax deed issuing therefrom.
However, the finality of a Section 266 tax deed order has not been
completely determined. On their own facts, the cases discussed herein,
including Cherin, Southmoor, and Urban, have not involved an attack on
an annual tax deed by reason of antecedent defects in the annual tax sale
proceedings. Such an attack frequently caused the invalidation of tax deeds
prior to 1951 because of defects in the original publication, judgment,
precept, or other steps antedating the tax sale. It is questionable therefore,
whether the 'cases since 1951 have been broad enough in scope to con-
stitute an adjudication that defects prior to the tax sale are cured by a
Section 266 order. From the consistent trend of the decisions establishing
the incontestability of tax titles, it would seem that such defects will be
held to be cured by a Section 266 order.
What could be a landmark case, Nix v. Smith,48 will be decided by
the Supreme Court in the very near future. This case will squarely put the
question of defects in the tax sale proceedings before the court. There was
no fraud alleged, and all of the requirements subsequent to the tax sale
43 Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at pp. 18-20; Reply Brief for Appellant,
pp. 8-10, Urban v. Lois, Inc., supra note 38.
44 20 Ill. App. 2d 562, 156 N.E.2d 774 (1959).
45 21 Ill. 2d 205, 171 N.E.2d 626 (1961). This case is especially interesting because
it is the only case before the Supreme Court involving a direct rather than a collateral
attack on a tax deed order. The court said as follows: "The record in this case clearly
demonstrates that the defendants had actual notice of the entire proceeding and to
require the assignee of the certificate of purchase to give them a written notice under
the circumstances of this case would be an idle gesture. The defendants could not have
been materially prejudiced by any failure to give such notice under the facts and
circumstances of the present proceeding." People v. Orth, 21 Ill. 2d at 210-11, 171 N.E.2d
at 628-29.
48 Supra note 39. In this case the court used lis pendens, but also implied estoppel.
See Farlow v. Oliver, 29 Ill. 2d 493, 194 N.E.2d 262 (1963), in which the court implied
estoppel.
47 A person acting with full knowledge of the facts cannot claim that he was deceived.
See 19 Ill. Law and Practice, Fraud § 13 (1956); Prosser, Torts 550 (2d ed. 1955).
48 Nix v. Smith, Doc. No. 38313, Sup. Ct. of Ill., Jan. Term, 1964. This case comes
up on a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is invoked because a freehold and the constitutionality of Section 266
of the Revenue Act are involved.
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were admittedly fulfilled.4 9 The irregularities alleged by the appellant
include the following facts: The descriptions of the lots in the notice by
publication were vague and uncertain; the amounts due as shown in the
notices were only numbers and not identified by words or signs to indicate
their character; the years for which the taxes were due were not set forth in
the notice as prescribed by Section 225 of the Revenue Act; 50 no affidavit
was entered at the end of the delinquent list by the County Collector stat-
ing that it was a true and correct list of the delinquent lands as prescribed
by Section 234 of the Revenue Act; 51 no judgment order of sale was
entered in the Tax Judgment Sale, Redemption and Forfeiture Record as
required by Section 235 of the Revenue Act; 52 the amount of the judgment
against the lots in the delinquent list was not stated in the column of the
list headed "Amount of Judgment" as required by Section 232 of the
Revenue Act; 53 and no precept of certificate as required by Section 239 of
the Revenue Act 54 was made and entered by the County Clerk in the
delinquent list. Yet, a Section 266 order was entered in this case as a result
of delinquent 1958 taxes, and a collateral attack has been made by the
appellant via a suit to quiet title to his real estate and remove the tax deeds
as clouds upon his title. These are all pre-sale defects, and the court must
decide whether or not they are jurisdictional.
Young v. Madden55 involved a tax deed issued under the Scavenger
Act,5 6 which provides for the deed to issue by way of an order almost
identical to Section 266. In this case, the court made a negative inference
which would seem to favor the appellant in the Nix case. The petitioner in
Young alleged defects in the original tax sale proceedings. Although the
court upheld the Section 266 order, it did so by stating that irregularities in
presale proceedings do not fall within the purview of Section 266. This case
held that Section 266 was enacted to ". . . provide for a judicial determina-
tion of what had previously been determined administratively-whether
the conditions precedent to the issuance of a tax deed had been performed."
And later the court stated: "Objections that would have been proper in the
original proceedings for judgment and sale for taxes are not proper here....
The sole issue before the court in this proceeding is whether the statutory
conditions subsequent to tax sale have been performed." 57
49 Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Ibid.
50 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 706 (1963).
51 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 715 (1963).
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 716 (1963).
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 713 (1963).
54 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 720 (1963).
55 20 Ill. 2d 506, 170 N.E.2d 551 (1960).
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 716a (1963).
57 Young v. Madden, supra note 55, at 510-11, 170 N.E.2d at 553-54. However, this
rationale seems to be contrary to Section 270 of the Revenue Act which provides inter
alia as follows:
And any judgment for the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, except
as otherwise provided in this section, shall estop all parties from raising any
objections thereto, or to a tax title based thereon, which existed at or before
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The question now arises as to whether the 1951 amendments to the
Revenue Act and the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have
proved to be effective in the collection of delinquent taxes. In the Urban
case, the Taxpayers Federation of Illinois was admonished not to include
matters not of record in the order granting it leave to file a brief as Amicus
Curiae.5s However, the author has obtained the following table which was
prepared for the amicus curiae brief and later omitted therefrom. These
statistics (which have been rounded out), may be used as a guide to indicate
the effectiveness of the 1951 Amendments. 59
Total Aggregate
Total No. of Items Over-the-
No. Items Aggregate Sold On Over- Counter For-
Sold At Sales the-Counter For- feiture Purchases
Year Annual Sale in Dollars feiture Purchases In Dollars
1949 2,900 $ 400,000 50 $ 2,000
1950 3,200 550,000 100 8,000
1959 9,000 2,500,000 2,000 2,400,000
1960 9,500 2,750,000 not available not available
Despite the fact that the over-all number of tax delinquencies has been
drastically reduced, not only has the volume of items sold at tax sales
increased, but active bidding now takes place so that many items are sold at
reduced penalty rates.
Another measure of the effectiveness of the 1951 Amendments in the
collection of delinquent taxes is a comparison of the percentage of tax
sales which went to tax deed prior to the 1951 Amendments with the per-
centage of tax sales which went to tax deed after their passage. As was
pointed out in the amicus curiae brief of Robert S. Cushman in Southmoor
v. Willis, since the passage of the 1951 Amendments the percentage of tax
deeds issued on improved properties has dropped drastically from approxi-
mately 12% in 1949 to less than 4% in 1953 in Cook County with similar
decreases in downstate counties.60
Also, as stated in the amicus curiae brief of the Taxpayers Federa-
tion of Illinois in Urban:
It is axiomatic that the knowledge that a tax deed will result in
the rendition of such judgment or decree, and could have been presented as a
defense to the application for such judgment in the court wherein the same was
rendered, and as to all such questions, the judgment itself shall be conclusive
evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral proceedings .... Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 120, § 751 (1963).
58 Brief for the Taxpayers Federation of Illinois as Amicus Curiae, p. 5, Urban v.
Lois, Inc., 29 Ill. 2d 532, 194 N.E.2d 294 (1963).
59 These statistics were prepared by the office of the Clerk of Cook County for
Taxpayers Federation of Illinois and appear herein by permission.
60 Brief for Robert S. Cushman as Amicus Curiae, pp. 15 & 16, Southmoor v. Willis,
15 Ill. 2d 388, 155 N.E.2d 308 (1958).
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a loss of property rather than a mere cloud on title will result in far
greater incentive for redemptions. As a result, the assured validity
of tax titles inevitably results in greater and prompter redemptions,
thereby increasing tax collections, and subsequently lowering the
tax rates.61
With the rash of tax sales which will be taking place in Cook County
in the near future,62 the 1951 Amendments will become particularly im-
portant to the residents of that County.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the statement by George E. Drach
in his amicus curiae brief in the Remer case63 is indeed noteworthy. He
stated:
There are, on the other hand, strong considerations of public
policy in favor of 'putting teeth' in the tax collecting machinery.
The question is considered to be an important one. If the rules
are to be materially changed which govern annual tax sale deeds in
Illinois-rules which have been evolved over many years,-that
change should be pointed out by the opinion of this Court, and
its extent clearly shown, so that members of the Bar and the public
can govern themselves accordingly. 64
The court in Remer honored Mr. Drach's request and clearly pointed
out the incontestability of Section 266 orders except in the case of fraud.
In fact, the court has announced its position consistently in every case,
except Young, involving a collateral attack on an order for the issuance
of a tax deed since 1951, including the recent Urban case. Therefore, the
members of the Bar and public have been apprised of the incontestability of
tax deeds.
It would not be surprising to this author if the Supreme Court should
declare in the near future that the payment of taxes is a fundamental
responsibility of a property owner in Illinois. The law is in the statutes,
and it is well known that delinquent tax properties are sold annually (in
October) for the collection of taxes. Therefore, all persons are charged
with standing notice of the consequences of delinquent property taxes;
and absolutely all defects or omissions in annual sale tax proceedings
61 Brief of the Taxpayers Federation of Illinois, supra note 58, at 6.
62 A recent edition of a Chicago newspaper reported the following in a front page
story:
An auction of 34,000 parcels of land and buildings in Cook County on which
taxes have not been paid for 10 years or more is expected to be held sometime
this year.
State's Attorney Daniel P. Ward, who proposed the auction, said it would
be the first such "scavenger sale" in the county under provisions of the 1939 State
Revenue Act.
Back taxes on the parcels total more than $18,000,000 and penalties and
interest total an additional $30,000,000 he said. Chicago Daily News, Jan. 16, 1964,
p. 1, col. 8 (final market ed.).
63 Brief of George E. Drach, Attorney as Amicus Curiae, Remer v. Interstate Bond
Company, 21 Ill. 2d 504, 173 N.E.2d 425 (1961).
64 Brief of George E. Drach, Attorney, Id. at pp. 20-21.
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should be cured by a Section 266 order except where fraud is perpetrated
by the purchaser or his assignee. In other words, ignorantia legis neminem
excusat-ignorance of the law is no defense.
If the foregoing viewpoint was adopted by the Supreme Court, it would
be in compliance with the basic legislative intent manifested in Section 266
that tax deeds shall be "incontestable."
L. S. DOTSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WHETHER STATE ACTION REQUIRING PUBLIC
SCHOOLS TO BEGIN EACH DAY WITH READINGS FROM THE BIBLE VIOLATES
THE FIRST AMENDMENT-The two companion cases herein considered,
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett,1
presented issues to the United States Supreme Court in the context of state
enactments compelling public schools to begin each day with readings from
the Bible.
In the Schempp case, a Pennsylvania statute required that:
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without
comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day.
Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending
such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or
guardian.2
The children, who were Unitarians, attended a high school at which
exercises were conducted pursuant to the statute. Selected students, super-
vised by teachers, read the passages. The statute as amended imposed no
penalty upon a teacher refusing to obey its mandate. However, the possi-
bility definitely existed that such a teacher would have his contract of
employment terminated for violating the school laws. During the exercises,
various different versions of the Bible were used. This was apparently
done so as to show no favoritism toward any one particular religion. No
comments or explanations were given and students and parents were noti-
fied that participation was not mandatory 3
The parents of the children brought an action in equity to enjoin the
practice created by the statute. At the trial, Edward Schempp, father of the
students, testified that he decided against withdrawing his children from
attending the exercises because he felt that the children's relationships with
1 374 U.S. 203, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1963).
2 Id. at 1562 (24 Pa. Stat. sec. 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960)
Dec. 17, 1959).
8 The action was brought in 1958 before the amendment authorizing a child's non-
attendance at the exercises upon parental request. The District Court held the statute
unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 177
F. Supp. 398. The statute was then amended and the judgment vacated and remanded
for further proceedings. 364 U.S. 298, 81 Sup. Ct. 268, 5 L. Ed. 2d 89.
